This work studies the success probability of linear cryptanalysis. Complete expressions for the success probability are obtained using two different approaches, namely the order statistics and the hypothesis testing based approaches. We argue that the hypothesis testing based approach is theoretically more sound and does not require a number of assumptions and approximations which are inherent in the order statistics based approach. For analysing success probability, a unifying framework of general key randomisation hypotheses is introduced. The previously used standard key randomisation hypotheses and the adjusted wrong key randomisation hypothesis can be seen to special cases of the general framework. Derivations of expressions for the success probability are carried out under both the settings of the plaintexts being sampled with and without replacements. Finally, the complete picture of the dependence of the success probability on the data complexity is derived and it is argued that in most practical scenarios, the success probability will be a monotone increasing function of the data complexity. We believe that compared to the extant literature, our work provides a deeper and more thorough understanding of the success probability of linear cryptanalysis.
Introduction
A block cipher is a fundamental cryptographic primitive. Such a primitive injectively maps an n-bit plaintext under the influence of a secret key to an n-bit ciphertext. The strength of a block cipher is assessed by determining its resistance to the known standard attacks.
Linear cryptanalysis [20] is a fundamental method of attacking a block cipher. To apply linear cryptanalysis, it is required to first obtain an approximate linear relation between the input and the output of a block cipher. Obtaining such a relation for a well designed cipher is a non-trivial task and requires a great deal of ingenuity along with a very careful examination of the internal structure of the mapping which defines the target block cipher. The present work does not address this aspect of linear cryptanalysis and it will be assumed that a linear relation is available.
The goal of (linear) cryptanalysis of a block cipher is to recover a portion of the secret key in time less than that required by a brute force algorithm to try out all possible keys. The portion of the key which is proposed to be recovered is called the target sub-key. An attack with such a goal is called a key recovery attack. A weaker goal is to be able to distinguish the output of the block cipher from that of a uniform random permutation and such attacks are called distinguishing attacks. In this work, we will concentrate only on key recovery attacks.
To apply linear cryptanalysis, it is required to obtain some data corresponding to the secret key. Such data consists of plaintext-ciphertext pairs (P i , C i ), i = 1, . . . , N , where C i is obtained by encrypting P i using the secret key. The plaintexts are chosen randomly. Typically, they are considered to be chosen under uniform random sampling with or without replacements.
Any method of determing the secret key from this data is statistical in nature. The output of the attack is a set of candidate values for the target sub-key. The attack is successful with some probability P S if the correct value of the target sub-key is in the set of candidate values. The size of the set of candidate values is also an important parameter. An attack is said to have a-bit advantage if the size of the set of candidate values is a fraction 2 −a of the number of possible values of the target sub-key [26] .
The goal of a statistical analysis of an attack is to be able to obtain a relation between the three fundamental parameters N , P S and a. In this work, we concentrate on obtaining P S as a function of N and a and closely examine the behaviour of P S as a function of N .
A linear approximation of a block cipher holds with certain probability. Broadly speaking, a key recovery attack proceeds by testing each value of the target sub-key against the linear approximation with respect to the available data. For the correct choice κ * of the target sub-key, the linear approximation holds with some probabilty p κ * while for an incorrect choice κ = κ * of the target sub-key, the linear approximation holds with some other probability p κ,κ * . The basis of the attack is a difference in p κ * and p κ,κ * . The detailed examination of the internal structure of the block cipher leads to an estimate of p κ * , while p κ,κ * is obtained from an analysis of the behaviour of a random mapping.
To perform a statistical analysis, it is required to hypothesise the values of p κ * and p κ,κ * . The hypothesis on p κ * is called the right key randomisation hypothesis, while the hypothesis on p κ,κ * is called the wrong key randomisation hypothesis. Until a few years ago, it was typical to hypothesis that p κ * is a constant p = 1/2 while p κ,κ * = 1/2. These are called the standard right and wrong key randomisation hypothesis respectively.
The adjusted wrong key randomisation hypothesis was introduced by Bogdanov and Tischhauser in [8] . Based on a previous work by Daemen and Rijmen [9] , it was hypothesised that p κ,κ * itself is a random variable following the normal distribution N (1/2, 2 −n−2 ). A later work by Ashur, Beyne and Rijmen [1] also used the adjusted wrong key randomisation hypothesis. The difference in [8] and [1] is in the manner in which the plaintexts P 1 , . . . , P N were assumed to be chosen -sampling with replacement was considered in [8] while sampling without replacement was considered in [1] . Both the works [8, 1] observed a non-monotonic dependence of the success probability on N and provided possible explanations for this phenomenon.
The actual statistical methodology used in [8, 1] is based on an earlier work by Selçuk [26] which was based on the use of order statistics. This, in turn, was a formalisation of a ranking methodology used in the original work of Matsui [20] which introduced linear cryptanalysis.
Our Contributions
We perform a complete and generalised analysis of success probability in linear cryptanalysis.
Complete expression for the success probability: The expression for success probability obtained by Selçuk [26] is incomplete. Suppose S is the event that an attack is successful. In [26] , Selçuk works considers a sub-event of S to be S leading to an incomplete expression for the success probability. The later works [8, 1] follow Selçuk's approach and hence also obtain incomplete expressions for the success probability. In the present work, we obtain the complete expression for the success probability.
Statistical methodology: The expression for the success probability can be derived in two different ways. The first method is based on an order statistics approach while the second method uses statistical hypothesis testing. We derive expressions for the success probability using both these methods. The expressions for the success probability obtained using the two different approaches are slightly different. They turn out to be equal if certain assumptions and approximations used by Selçuk in [26] are applied to the expression obtained from the order statistics based approach. Some theoretical limitations of the order statistics approach was pointed out in [24] . In the present work, we identify two other implicit independence assumptions that need to be made to apply this approach. In contrast, the hypothesis testing based analysis does not suffer from the theoretical limitations and nor are any assumptions or approximations required. So, from a theoretical point of view, the hypothesis testing based approach is more satisfying. Consequently, we take the expression obtained from the hypothesis testing based approach to be the correct expression for the success probability.
General key randomisation hypotheses: Following the formalisation of the adjusted wrong key randomisation hypothesis, we introduce the general key randomisation hypotheses. The general right key randomisation hypothesis models p κ * as a random variable following N (p, s 2 0 ) and the general wrong key randomisation hypothesis models p κ,κ * as a random variable following N (1/2, s 2 1 ). The expression for success probabilty is obtained in terms of p, s 0 and s 1 . Letting s 0 , s 1 ↓ 0, we obtain the standard key randomisation hypothesis while setting s 1 = 2 −n−2 gives the adjusted wrong key randomisation hypothesis. As a result, from the general expression for the success probability, we are able to obtain particular expressions for the success probability under standard key randomisation hypotheses and under the adjusted wrong key randomisation hypothesis. Further, our method of analysis covers both the cases of sampling with and without replacements allowing us to obtain expressions for the success probability under both these sampling strategies. We note that the standard right key randomisation hypothesis has been extended to the adjusted right key randomisation hypothesis in the context of multiple linear cryptanalysis [6] .
Analysis of non-monotonicity of the success probability: We perform a general analysis of the dependence of the success probability on N . We show that if the Fisher information about the mean p in the random variable p κ * is not more than the Fisher information about the mean 1/2 in the random variable p κ,κ * , then the success probability is a monotone increasing function of N . On the other hand, depending on the relative values of s 0 , s 1 and p, we obtain cases where the success probability indeed decreases with increasing N . By using appropriate values of s 0 and s 1 , we particularise the analysis to the case of adjusted wrong key randomisation hypothesis for both sampling with and without replacements. The complete picture of the dependence of the success probability on N is worked out in both these cases. Under a relatively mild assumption on the magnitude of p, it can be shown that the success probability is again a monotonic increasing function of N . For the adjusted wrong key randomisation hypothesis, the previous analyses [8, 1] of the dependence of success probability on N did not reveal the complete picture that this described in this work.
Previous and Related Work
Linear cryptanalysis was first proposed by Matsui in [20] . Junod [15] gave a detailed analysis of Matsui's ranking method [20, 21] . This work introduced the notion of ordered statistics in linear cryptanalysis. The idea was further developed by Selçuk in [26] , where he used a well known asymptotic result from the theory of ordered statistic to arrive at an expression for the success probability. Building on a work by Daemen and Rijmen [9] , a paper by Bogdanov and Tischhauser [7] introduced the adjusted wrong key randomisation hypothesis. The work [7] considered the plaintexts to be sampled with replacement. A later work by Ashur, Beyne and Rijmen [1] analysed success probability under adjusted wrong key randomisation hypothesis in the setting where the plaintexts are sampled without replacements.
Analysis of attacks using multiple linear approximations has been reported in the literature [21, 18, 4, 17, 2, 16, 3, 11, 22, 13, 6, 14, 24, 25, 23] . Since this paper is concerned only with the basic setting of a single linear approximation, we do not discuss the various aspects which arise in the context of multiple linear approximations.
LINEAR CRYPTANALYSIS: BACKGROUND AND STATISTICAL MODEL

2 Linear Cryptanalysis: Background and Statistical Model
Let E : {0, 1} k × {0, 1} n → {0, 1} n denote a block cipher such that for each K ∈ {0, 1} k , E K (·) ∆ = E(K, ·) is a bijection from the set {0, 1} n to itself. Here K is called the secret key. The n-bit input to the block cipher is called the plaintext and n-bit output of the block cipher is called the ciphertext.
Block ciphers are generally constructed by composing round functions where each round function is parametrised by a round key. The round functions are also bijections of {0, 1} n to itself. The round keys are produced by applying an expansion function, called the key scheduling algorithm, to the secret key K. Denote the round keys by k (0) , k (1) , . . . and the round functions by R (0)
K (i) denote the composition of the first i round functions, i.e., E
(1)
A block cipher may have many rounds and for the purposes of estimating the strength of a block cipher, a cryptanalytic attempt may target only some of these rounds. Such an attack is called a reduced round cryptanalysis. Suppose an attack targets the first r + 1 rounds where the block cipher may possibly have more than r + 1 rounds. For a plaintext P , we denote by C the output after r + 1 rounds, i.e., C = E (r+1) K (r+1) (P ), and by B the output after r rounds, i.e., B = E (r)
Linear approximation: Any block cipher cryptanalysis starts off with a detailed analysis of the structure of the block cipher. This results in one or more relations between the plaintext P , the input to the last round B and possibly the expanded key K (r) . In case of linear cryptanalysis a linear relation of the following form is obtained.
where Γ P , Γ B ∈ {0, 1} n and Γ K (r) ∈ {0, 1} nr denote the plaintext mask, the mask to the input of the last round and the key mask. A relation of the form given by (1) is called a linear approximation of the block cipher. Such a linear approximation usually holds with some probability which is taken over the random choices of the plaintext P . Obtaining such a linear approximation and the corresponding probability is a non-trivial task and requires a lot of ingenuity and experience. This forms the basis on which the statistical analysis of block ciphers is built.
Define
Inner key bit:
Note that for a fixed but unknown key K (r) , z is a single unknown bit. Since the key mask Γ K is known, the bit z is determined only by the unknown but fixed K (r) . Hence, there is no randomness in either of K (r) or z. The bit z is called the inner key bit.
Target sub-key: A linear relation of the form (1) usually involves only a subset of the bits of B. In order to obtain these bits from the ciphertext C it is required to partially decrypt C by one round. This involves a subset of the bits of the last round key k (r) . We call this subset of bits of the last round key to be the target sub-key. The ciphertext C is obtained by encrypting P using a key K. By κ * we denote the value of the target sub-key corresponding to the key K. We are interested in a key recovery attack where the goal is to find κ * .
Let the size of the target sub-key be m. These m bits are sufficient to partially decrypt C by one round and obtain the bits of B involved in the linear approximation. There are 2 m possible choices of the target sub-key out of which only one is correct. The purpose of the attack is to identify the correct value.
Probability and bias of a linear approximation: Let P be a plaintext chosen uniformly at random from {0, 1} n ; C be the corresponding ciphertext; and B be the result of partially decrypting C with a choice κ of the target sub-key. The random variable B depends on the choice κ that is used to partially invert C. Further, C depends on the correct value κ * of the target sub-key and hence so does B. So, the random variable L defined in (2) depends on κ and κ * and we write L κ,κ * to emphasise this dependence. For κ = κ * , we will simply write L κ * . Define
Here κ,κ * and κ * are the biases corresponding to incorrect and correct choices of the target sub-key respectively. The secret key K is a fixed quantity and so the randomness arises solely from the uniform random choice of P .
Statistical model of the attack: Let P 1 , . . . , P N , with N ≤ 2 n , be chosen randomly following some distribution from the set {0, 1} n of all possible plaintexts. It is assumed that the adversary possesses the N plaintext-ciphertext pairs (P j , C j ); j = 1, 2, . . . , N where C j = E K (P j ) for some fixed key K. Using the linear approximation and the N plaintext-ciphertext pairs, the adversary has to find κ * in time faster than a brute force search on all possible keys of the block cipher.
For each choice κ of the target sub-key it is possible for the attacker to partially decrypt each C j by one round to obtain B κ,j ; j = 1, 2, . . . , N . Note that B κ,j depends on κ even though C j may not do so. Clearly, if κ = κ * , then the C j 's depend on κ, while if κ = κ * , C j has no relation to κ.
Note that X κ,z,j ⊕ X κ,1⊕z,j = 1 and so X κ,0 + X κ,1 = N . X κ,z,j is determined by the pair (P j , C j ), the choice κ of the target sub-key and the choice z of the inner key bit. Since C j depends upon K and hence upon κ * , X κ,z,j also depends upon κ * through C j . The randomness in X κ,z,j arises from the randomness in P j and also possibly from the previous choices P 1 , . . . , P j−1 . X κ,z,j is binary valued and the probability Pr[X κ,z,j = 1] potentially depends upon the following quantities: z : the choice of the inner key bit; p κ * or p κ,κ * : the probabilities of linear approximation as given in (3) . j : the index determining the pair (P j , C j ).
This models a general scenario which captures a possible dependence on the index j. The dependence on j will be determined by the joint distribution of the plaintexts P 1 , . . . , P N . In the case that P 1 , . . . , P N are independent and uniformly distributed, Pr[X κ,z,j = 1] does not depend on j. On the other hand, suppose that P 1 , . . . , P N are sampled without replacement. In such a scenario, Pr[X κ,z,j = 1] does depend on j.
Test statistic: For each choice κ of the target sub-key and each choice z of the inner key bit, let T κ,z ≡ T (X κ,z,1 , . . . , X κ,z,N ) denote a test statistic. Then T κ,z is a random variable whose randomness arises from the randomness of P 1 , . . . , P N . Define
So, the test statistic T κ,z does not depend on the value of z and it is sufficient to consider z = 0. Remark: To simplify notation, we will write X κ,j and X κ instead of X κ,0,j and X κ,0 respectively; W κ and T κ instead of W κ,0 and T κ,0 respectively. Using this notation, the test statistic T κ is defined in the following manner.
This test statistic was considered by Matsui [20] . There are 2 m choices of the target sub-key and so there are 2 m random variables T κ . The distribution of T κ depends on whether κ is correct or incorrect. To perform a statistical analysis of an attack, it is required to obtain the distribution of T κ under both correct and incorrect choices of κ. Later we consider this issue in more details.
Success probability: An attack will produce a set (or a list) of candidate values of the target sub-key. The attack is considered successful if the correct value of the target sub-key κ * is in the output set. The probability of this event is called the success probability of the attack.
Advantage: An attack is said to have advantage a if the size of the set of candidate values of the target sub-key is equal to 2 m−a . In other words, a fraction 2 −a portion of the possible 2 m values of the target sub-key is produced by the attack.
Data complexity: The number N of plaintext-ciphertext pairs required for an attack is called the data complexity of the attack. Clearly, N depends on the success probability P S and the advantage a. One of the goals of a statistical analysis is to be able to obtain a closed form relation between N , P S and a.
Notation on normal distributions: By N (µ, σ 2 ) we will denote the normal distribution with mean µ and variance σ 2 . The density function of N (µ, σ 2 ) will be denoted by f(x; µ, σ 2 ). The density function of the standard normal will be denoted by φ(x) while the distribution function of the standard normal will be denoted by Φ(x).
Success Probability in Linear Cryptanalysis
As given in (8) , the test statistic is
To obtain the success probability of the attack it is required to obtain the distributions of T κ for the two scenarios when κ = κ * and when κ = κ * . This is obtained from the distributions of W κ * and W κ for κ = κ * . Suppose, the following holds.
We now consider the derivation of the success probability of linear cryptanalysis in terms of µ 0 , σ 0 and σ 1 using both the order statistics based analysis and the hypothesis testing based analysis. Later, we will see how to obtain µ 0 , σ 0 and σ 1 . In particular, we will see that σ 0 and σ 1 depend on N whereas µ 0 is a constant.
Order Statistics Based Analysis
This approach is based on a ranking methodology used originally by Matsui [20] and later formalised by Selçuk [26] . The idea is the following. There are 2 m random variables T κ corresponding to the 2 m possible values of the target sub-key. Suppose the variables are denoted as T 0 , . . . , T 2 m −1 and assume that T 0 = |W 0 | corresponds to the choice of the correct target sub-key κ * , where W 0 follows the distribution of W κ * which is
is the ascending order sort of T 1 , . . . , T 2 m −1 . So, the event corresponding to a successful attack with a-bit advantage is T 0 > T (2 m q) where q = 1 − 2 −a .
Using a well known result on order statistics, the distribution of T (2 m q) can be assumed to approximately follow N (µ q , σ 2 q ) where
2 −(m+a)/2 (see Appendix A.1). Using this result, P S can be approximated in the following manner.
Some criticisms: The order statistics based approach is crucially dependent on the normal approximation of the distribution of the order statistics. In the statistics literature, this result appears in an asymptotic form. Using the well known Berry-Esséen theorem, a concrete upper bound on the error in such approximation was obtained in [24] . A key observation is that the order statistics result is applied to 2 m random variables and for the result to be applied even in an asymptotic context, it is necessary that 2 m is sufficiently large. A close analysis of the hypothesis of the theorem and the error bound in the concrete setting showed the following issues. We refer to [24] for details.
m must be large: This condition arises from a convergence requirement on one of the quantities in the theorem showing the result on order statistics. For the error in such convergence to be around 10 −3 , it is required that m should be at least around 20 bits. So, if the size of the target sub-key is small, then the applicability of the order statistics based analysis is not clear.
m − a must be large: This condition arises from the requirement that the error in the normal approximation is small. If the error is to be around 10 −3 , then m − a should be at least around 20 bits. Recall that a is the advantage of the attack. So, for attacks with high advantage, the applicability of the order statistics based analysis is not clear.
Independence assumptions: Two assumptions are required for the analysis to be meaningful and these were implicitly used by Selçuk in [26] .
1. The approximation of the distribution of the order statistic T (2 m q) by normal is a key step in the order statistics based approach. As mentioned above, this follows from a standard result in mathematical statistics. The hypothesis of this result requires the random variables T 1 , T 2 , . . . , T 2 m −1 to be independent and identically distributed. It indeed holds that T 1 , T 2 , . . . , T 2 m −1 are identically distributed. However, the randomness of all of these random variables arise from the randomness of P 1 , . . . , P N and so these random variables are certainly not independent. So, the independence of these random variables is a heuristic assumption.
2. Considering W 0 and T (2 m q) to follow normal distributions, it is assumed that W 0 − T (2 m q) (and W 0 + T (2 m q) ) also follows a normal distribution. A sufficient condition for W 0 − T (2 m q) to follow a normal distribution is that W 0 and T (2 m q) are independent. If W 0 and T (2 m q) are not independent, then it is not necessarily true that W 0 − T (2 m q) follows a normal distribution even if W 0 and T (2 m q) follow normal distributions. So, in assuming W 0 − T (2 m q) to follow a normal distribution, it is implicitly assumed that W 0 and T (2 m q) are independent. Since the randomness of both W 0 and T (2 m q) arise from the randomness in P 1 , . . . , P N , they are clearly not independent. As a result, the assumption that W 0 − T (2 m q) follows a normal distribution is also a heuristic assumption.
In short, the above two assumptions can be summarised as assuming that the test statistics corresponding to different choices of the sub-key are independent. We note that such assumptions are sometimes made in the context of cryptanalysis though it is a bit surprising that the above assumptions do not seem to have been explicitly mentioned in the literature. In later works on multiple linear and multiple differential cryptanalysis, the order statistics based analysis has been used in a number of papers [8, 13, 5, 6] . The above mentioned issues, i.e., both m and m − a have to be large; and the assumption that the test statistics for different choices of the sub-key are independent, apply to all such works.
Hypothesis Testing Based Analysis
Statistical hypothesis testing for analysing block cipher cryptanalysis was carried out in [2] in the context of distinguishing attacks. For analysing key recovery attacks on block ciphers, hypothesis testing based approach was used in [24] as a method for overcoming some of the theoretical limitations of the order statistics based analysis. Subsequently, hypothesis testing based approach for analysing key recovery attacks in the context of key dependent assumptions was performed in [6] .
The idea of the hypothesis testing based approach is simple and intuitive. For each choice κ of the target sub-key, let H 0 be the null hypothesis that κ is correct and H 1 be the alternative hypothesis that κ is incorrect. The test statistic T κ = |W κ | is used to test H 0 against H 1 where the distributions of W κ are as in (9) for both κ = κ * and κ = κ * . The following hypothesis test is considered.
Here t is a threshold whose exact value is determined depending on the desired success probability and advantage. Such a hypothesis test gives rise to two kinds of errors: H 0 is rejected when it holds which is called the Type-1 error; and H 0 is accepted when it does not hold which is called the Type-2 error. If a Type-1 error occurs, then κ = κ * is the correct value of the target sub-key but, the test rejects it and so the attack fails to recover the correct value. So, the attack is successful if and only if Type-1 error does not occur. So, the success probability
On the other hand, for every Type-2 error, an incorrect value of κ gets labelled as a candidate key. So, the number of times that Type-2 errors occurs is the size of the list of candidate keys.
where
and the expected number of times that Type-2 errors occurs is 2 m−a .
Proof. First assume µ 0 > 0. Let α = Pr[Type-1 error] and β = Pr[Type-2 error] and so P S = 1 − α. For each κ = κ * , let Z κ be a binary valued random variable which takes the value 1 if and only if a Type-2 error occurs for κ. So, Pr[Z κ = 1] = β. The size of the list of candidate keys returned by the test is κ =κ * Z κ and so the expected size of the list of candidate keys is
The expected number of times that Type-2 errors occurs is 2 m−a . So,
The Type-1 and Type-2 error probabilities are calculated as follows.
Using β = 2 m−a /(2 m − 1) in (18), we obtain
Substituting t in (17) and noting that P S = 1 − α, we obtain
If µ 0 < 0, then an analysis similar to the above shows that the resulting expression for the success probability is still given by (13) .
Remarks:
, where lg is logarithm to base two. We will be interested in attacks where the advantage a is at least lg(2 m /(2 m − 1)) so that γ can be assumed to be non-negative.
2. The computation in (14) does not require the Z κ 's or the T κ 's to be independent.
3. The theoretical limitations of the order statistics based analysis (namely, m and m − a are large and the heuristic assumption that the T κ 's are independent) are not present in the hypothesis testing based analysis.
4. Comparing (13) to (11), we find that the two expressions are equal under the following two assumptions:
(a) 2 m /(2 m − 1) ≈ 1: this holds for moderate values of m, but, is not valid for small values of m.
(b) σ 0 σ q : this assumption was used in [26] and we provide more details later.
In the rest of the work, we will use (13) as the expression for the success probability.
General Key Randomisation Hypotheses
Recall the definitions of p κ,κ * and p κ * from (3). The corresponding biases are κ,κ * and κ * . For obtaining the distributions of W κ * and W κ , κ = κ * , it is required to hypothesise the behaviour of p κ * and p κ,κ * respectively. The two standard key randomisation hypotheses are the following.
Standard right key randomisation hypothesis: p κ * = p, for some constant p for every choice of κ * . Standard wrong key randomisation hypothesis: p κ,κ * = 1/2 for every choice of κ * and κ = κ * .
The standard wrong key randomisation hypothesis was formally considered in [12] , though it was used in earlier works. Modification of this hypothesis has been been considered in the literature. Based on an earlier work [9] on the distribution of correlations for a uniform random permutation, the standard wrong key randomisation hypothesis was relaxed in [8] . Under the standard wrong key randomisation hypothesis, the bias κ,κ * = 0. In [8] , it was suggested that instead of assuming κ,κ * to be 0, κ,κ * should be assumed to follow a normal distribution with expectation 0 and variance 2 −n−2 . This is stated more formally as follows.
Adjusted wrong key randomisation hypothesis:
For κ = κ * , κ,κ * ∼ N 0, 2 −n−2 , or, equivalently p κ,κ * ∼ N 1/2, 2 −n−2 .
Remarks:
1. In this hypothesis, there is no explicit dependence of the bias on either κ or κ * . The reason why such a situation arises is that in [9] , a discrete distribution has been approximated by a normal distribution without adjusting for the possibility that the values may fall outside the meaningful range. From a theoretical point of view, assuming κ,κ * to follow a normal distribution cannot be formally justified. Hence, the adjusted wrong key randomisation hypothesis must necessarily be considered to be a heuristic assumption.
3. The variance 2 −n−2 is an exponentially decreasing function of n and by Chebyshev's inequality Pr[|p κ,κ * − 1/2| > 1/2] ≤ 4 · 2 −n−2 = 2 −n . In other words, p κ,κ * takes values outside [0, 1] with exponentially low probability.
4. The formal statement of the adjusted wrong key randomisation hypothesis appears as Hypothesis 2 in [8] and is | κ,κ * | ∼ N 1/2, 2 −n−2 , i.e., the condition in Hypothesis 2 of [8] is on the absolute value of κ,κ * rather than on κ,κ * . Since the absolute value is by definition a non-negative quantity, it is not meaningful to model its distribution using normal. In fact, the proof of Lemma 5.9 in the thesis [27] makes use of the hypothesis without the absolute value, i.e., it uses the hypothesis as stated above. Further, the later work [1] also uses the hypothesis without the absolute value. So, in this work we will use the hypothesis as stated above and without the absolute sign.
While the adjusted wrong key randomisation hypothesis was used in [8] and later in [1] both of these works used the standard right key randomisation hypothesis. Modification of the right key randomisation hypothesis was considered in [6] in the context of multiple/multi-dimensional linear cryptanalysis. Based on the formulation in [6] and the adjusted wrong key randomisation hypothesis, it is possible to formulate an adjusted right key randomisation hypothesis. Motivated by this consideration we formulate the following general key randomisation hypotheses for both the right and the wrong key.
General right key randomisation hypothesis:
where p is a fixed value and s 2 0 ≤ 2 −n ; let = p − 1/2.
General wrong key randomisation hypothesis:
We note the following.
1. As s 0 ↓ 0, the random variable p κ * becomes degenerate and takes the value of the constant p. In this case, the general right key randomisation hypothesis becomes the standard right key randomisation hypothesis.
2. As s 1 ↓ 0, the random variable p κ,κ * becomes degenerate and takes the value 1/2. In this case, the general wrong key randomisation hypothesis becomes the standard wrong key randomisation hypothesis.
3. For s 2 1 = 2 −n−2 , the general wrong key randomisation hypothesis becomes the adjusted wrong key randomisation hypothesis.
So, the general key randomisation hypotheses covers both the standard (right and wrong) key randomisation hypotheses and also the adjusted wrong key randomisation hypothesis. In view of this, we perform the statistical analysis of success probability in terms of the general key randomisation hypotheses and later deduce the special cases of the standard and the adjusted key randomisation hypotheses.
Remark: The issues discussed in Points 1 to 3 as part of the remarks after the adjusted wrong key randomisation hypothesis also hold for both the general right and the general wrong key randomisation hypotheses. In particular, we note that the requirements s 2 0 ≤ 2 −n and s 2 1 ≤ 2 −n have been imposed so that using Chebyshev's inequality, we obtain Pr[
Analysis of Success Probability
Given the behaviour of p κ and p κ,κ * modelled by the two general key randomisation hypotheses, the main task is to obtain normal approximations of the distributions of W κ * and W κ as given by (9) . This will provide the values of µ 0 , σ 0 and σ 1 . Plugging in these values into the expression given by (13) provides the corresponding expression for the success probability. The distributions of W κ * and W κ depend on whether P 1 , . . . , P N are chosen with or without replacement. We separately consider both these cases.
In the general key randomisation hypotheses, we have
So, with exponentially low probability, p κ * takes values outside the range [p
and θ = p − 1/2, we have − θ 0 ≤ θ ≤ + θ 0 and so
under the assumption that ( + θ 0 ) 2 is negligible. Similarly, let ϑ 2 1 = s 2 1 2 n/2 ≤ 2 −n/2 and as above, we have by Chebyshev's inequality
Further, let
under the assumption that 2 −n/2 is negligible.
5.1 Distributions of W κ * and W κ , κ = κ * under Uniform Random Sampling with Replacement
In this case, P 1 , . . . , P N are chosen under uniform random sampling with replacement so that P 1 , . . . , P N are assumed to be independent and uniformly distributed over {0, 1} n .
First consider W κ * whose distribution is determined from the distribution of p κ * . Recall that X κ * = X κ * ,1 + · · · + X κ * ,N . Since P 1 , . . . , P N are independent, the random variables X κ * ,1 , . . . , X κ * ,N are also independent. Under the general right key randomisation assumption, p κ * is modelled as a random variable following N (p, s 2 0 )
and so the density function of p κ * is f(p; p, s 2 0 ). The distribution function of X κ * is approximated as follows:
The sum within the integral is the distribution function of the binomial distribution and can be approximated by N (N p, N p(1 − p) ). In this approximation, the variance of the normal also depends on p which makes it difficult to proceed with further analysis. Using (21), it is possible to approximate p(1 − p)) as 1/4. This approximation, however, is valid only for p ∈ [p − θ 0 , p + θ 0 ] and under the assumption that ( + θ 0 ) 2 is negligible.
In particular, the approximation is not valid for values of p close to 0 or 1. The probability that p is not in [p − θ 0 , p + θ 0 ] is exponentially small as shown in (20) . So, we break up the integral in (24) in a manner such that the approximation p(1 − p)) ≈ 1/4 can be made in the range p − θ 0 to p + θ 0 and it is possible to show that the contribution to (24) for p outside this range is negligible.
)dp
)dp (25)
f(p; p, s 2 0 )dp
The sum inside the integral is approximated by the distribution function of N (N p, N p(1 − p)). The range of the integration over p is from p − θ 0 to p + θ 0 . Using (21) , it follows that for p ∈ [p − θ 0 , p + θ 0 ] the normal distribution N (N p, N p(1 − p)) can be approximated as N (N p, N/4) (i.e., p(1 − p) ≈ 1/4) under the assumption that ( + θ 0 ) 2 is negligible. Note that the above analysis has been done to ensure that the range of p is such that this approximation is meaningful.
)dp.
f(x; N p, N/4)dx f(p; p, s 2 0 )dp.
The last equality follows from Proposition 1 in Section A.2. Comparing (24) and (27) , it may appear that a roundabout route has been taken to essentially replace the sum inside the integral by a normal approximation. On the other hand, without taking this route, we do not see how to justify that the variance of this normal approximation is approximately N/4. From (29), the distribution of X κ * is approximately N (N p, s 2 0 N 2 + N/4). Consequently, the distribution of W κ * = X κ * /N − 1/2 is approximately given as follows:
For W κ with κ = κ * , we need to consider the general wrong key randomisation hypothesis where p κ,κ * is modelled as a random variable following N (1/2, s 2 1 ). A similar analysis as above is carried out where instead of (20) and (21), the relations (22) and (23) 
Remark: For the adjusted wrong key randomisation hypothesis, i.e., with s 2 1 = 2 −n−2 , in [8] the distribution of W κ for κ = κ * was stated without proof to be N 0, ). This refers to the fact that the sum of two independent normal distributed random variables is also normal distributed. While this fact is well known, it is not relevant to the present analysis.
Distributions of W κ * and W κ , κ = κ * under Uniform Random Sampling without Replacement
In this scenario, the plaintexts P 1 , . . . , P N are chosen according to uniform random sampling without replacement. As a result, P 1 , . . . , P N are no longer independent and correspondingly neither are X κ,1 , . . . , X κ,N . So, the analysis in the case for sampling with replacement needs to be modified.
We first consider the distribution of W κ * in the scenario where p κ * is a random variable. A fraction p κ * of the 2 n possible plaintexts P satisfies the condition Γ P , P ⊕ Γ B , B = 1. Let us say that a plaintext P is 'red' if the condition Γ P , P ⊕ Γ B , B = 1 holds for P ; otherwise, we say that P is 'white'. So there are p κ * 2 n red plaintexts in {0, 1} n and the other plaintexts are white. For k ∈ {0, . . . , N }, the event X κ * = k is the event of picking k red plaintexts in N trials from an urn containing 2 n plaintexts out of which p κ * 2 n are red and the rest are white. So,
Under the general right key randomisation hypothesis it is assumed that p κ * follows N (p, s 2 0 ) so that the density function of p κ * is taken to be f(p; p, s 2 0 ). Then
An analysis along the lines of (25) to (26) using (20) shows that
The sum within the integral can be seen to be the distribution function of the hypergeometric distribution Hypergeometric(N, 2 n , p2 n ). If N 2 n , then the hypergeometric distribution approximately follows Bin(N, p); on the other hand, if N/2 n = t ∈ (0, 1), then the hypergeometric distribution approximately follows N (pN, N (1− t)p(1 − p)) (see Appendix A.3) which using t = N/2 n is equal to N (pN,
under the assumption that ( + θ 0 ) 2 is negligible. Again, we note that the approximation holds in the mentioned range of p and it is not valid for values of p close to 0 or 1.
The last equality follows from Proposition 1 in Section A.2. So, X κ * approximately follows N (N p, s 2 0 N 2 + N (1 − N/2 n )/4) and since W κ * = X κ * /N − 1/2 we have that the distribution of W κ * is approximately given as follows:
For W κ with κ = κ * , we need to consider the general wrong key randomisation hypothesis where p κ,κ * is modelled as a random variable following N (1/2, s 2 1 ). In this case, it is required to use (22) and (23) instead of (20) and (21) respectively. In particular, as in the case of sampling with replacement, we note that for
The validity of this follows from (23) and the approximation is not valid for values of p near to 0 or 1. With these approximations, the resulting analysis shows the following approximate distribution:
Remark: In [1] , for the adjusted wrong key randomisation hypothesis, i.e., with s 2 1 = 2 −n−2 , the distribution of W κ for κ = κ * was stated to be N 0, 1 4N . We note the following issues.
1. The supporting argument in [1] was given to be the fact that if two random variables X and Y are such that X ∼ N (aY, σ 2 1 ) and Y ∼ N (µ, σ 2 2 ), then X ∼ N (aµ, σ 2 1 + a 2 σ 2 2 ) (see Proposition 2 in the appendix for a proof). This argument, however, is not complete. The distribution function of X κ for κ = κ * is
After interchanging the order of the sum and the integration, one can apply the normal approximation of the hypergeometric distribution. It is not justified to directly start with the normal approximation of the hypergeometric distribution as has been done in [1] .
2. The issue is more subtle than simply a question of interchanging the order of the sum and the integral. After applying the normal approximation of the hypergeometric distribution one ends up with N (N/2,
. This requires assuming that (p − 1/2) 2 is negligible. Clearly, this assumption is not valid for values of p close to 0 or 1. On the other hand, the approximation is justified for p ∈ [1/2−ϑ 1 , 1/2+ϑ 1 ] under the assumption that s 2 1 2 n/2 = 2 −2−n/2 is negligible (see (23) ). Also, the probability that p takes values outside [1/2 − ϑ 1 , 1/2 + ϑ 1 ] is exponentially low as shown in (22) . So, it is required to argue that the integral in (35) is from 1/2 − ϑ 1 to 1/2 + ϑ 1 and the contribution of the integral outside this range is negligible. This can be done in a manner which is similar to that done in Steps (25) to (26) . In [1] , the assumption that (p − 1/2) 2 is negligible has been made for all values of p which is not justified.
Success Probability under General Key Randomisation Hypotheses
The distributions of W κ * and W κ for κ = κ * are respectively given by (30) and (31) for the case of sampling with replacement and are given by (33) and (34) for the case of sampling without replacement. These expressions can be compactly expressed in the following form:
for sampling with replacement;
for sampling without replacement.
Substituting σ 2 0 = s 2 0 + σ 2 and σ 2 1 = s 2 1 + σ 2 in Theorem 1, we obtain the following result.
Theorem 2. Let κ * ∈ {0, 1} m . For κ ∈ {0, 1} m , let T κ = |W κ | be 2 m random variables, where W κ * ∼ N (µ 0 , s 2 0 + σ 2 ), µ 0 = 0 and W κ ∼ N (0, s 2 1 + σ 2 ) for κ = κ * . Suppose the hypothesis test given in (12) is applied to T κ for all κ ∈ {0, 1} m . Let P S = 1 − Pr[Type-1 error]. Then
Let P (wr) S denote the success probability when sampling with replacement is used and let P (wor) S denote the success probability when sampling without replacement is used. Using the corresponding expressions for σ from (37) in (38) we obtain the following expressions for P (wr) S and P (wor) S .
(39)
. So, the expression for P
(wor) S
given by (40) becomes useful only when the fraction N/2 n is non-negligible.
2. In the case of sampling with replacement, due to the birthday paradox, having N to be greater than 2 n/2
is not really useful, since repetitions will begin to occur.
Success Probability Under Standard Key Randomisation Hypotheses
Let P (wr,std) S and P (wor,std) S be the success probabilities for standard key randomisation hypotheses corresponding to the situations where plaintexts are chosen with and without replacement respectively. As discussed in Section 4, the standard key randomisation hypotheses is obtained from the general key randomisation hypothesis by letting s 0 ↓ 0 and s 1 ↓ 0. Using these conditions in (39) and (40) lead to the following expressions for the success probabilities in the two cases of sampling with and without replacement.
Success probability in [26] : Selçuk [26] had obtained an expression for the success probability under the standard key randomisation hypotheses and under the assumption that P 1 , . . . , P N are chosen uniformly with replacements. The expression for P (wr,std) S given by (41) was not obtained in [26] . This is due to the following reasons.
1. For analysing the success probability, Selçuk [26] employed the order statistics based approach. As discussed in Section 3.1, in this approach the T 's are written as T 0 , . . . , T 2 m −1 and it is assumed that T 0 corresponds to the right key. With this set-up, an attack with a-bit advantage is successful, if T 0 > T (2 m q) where q = 1−2 −a . Selçuk [26] insteads considers success to be the event W 0 > T (2 m q) and the condition W 0 /µ 0 > 0. Since the T 's can take only non-negative values, it follows that T (2 m q) ≥ 0 and so the event W 0 > T (2 m q) implies W 0 > 0 and so µ 0 > 0. Conversely, if µ 0 < 0, then for the condition W 0 /µ 0 > 0 to hold we must have W 0 < 0 in which case the event W 0 > T (2 m q) is an impossible event. So, the condition W 0 > T (2 m q) subsumes the condition W 0 /µ 0 > 0 for µ 0 > 0 and has probability 0 for µ 0 < 0. No justification is provided in [26] for considering success to be W 0 > T (2 m q) instead of T 0 > T (2 m q) . From (10) we see that the event W 0 > T (2 m q) is a sub-event of T 0 > T (2 m q) which is the event that the attack is successful.
2. It is assumed that σ 0 σ q . This is justified in [26] by providing numerical values for a in the range 8 ≤ a ≤ 48 and it is mentioned that the assumption especially holds for success probability 0.8 or more.
Under the above two assumptions, the expression for success probability obtained in [26] is the following.
Assume that m is large so that 2 m − 1 ≈ 2 m and so γ ≈ Φ −1 (1 − 2 −a−1 ). Then the right hand side of (43) becomes equal to the first term of (41). This shows that the expression for the success probability obtained in [26] is incomplete.
To the best of our knowledge, no prior work has analysed the success probability of linear cryptanalysis with the standard key randomisation hypotheses and under the condition where P 1 , . . . , P N are chosen uniformly without replacement. So, the expression for P (wor,std) S given by (42) is the first such result.
Success Probability Under Adjusted Wrong Key Randomisation Hypothesis
Let P (wr,adj) S and P (wor,adj) S be the success probabilities for adjusted wrong key randomisation hypothesis (and standard right key randomisation hypothesis) corresponding to the situations where plaintexts are chosen with and without replacement respectively.
Setting s 2 1 = 2 −n−2 converts the general wrong key randomisation hypothesis to the adjusted wrong key randomisation hypothesis. Also, we let s 0 ↓ 0, so that the general right key randomisation hypothesis simplifies to the standard right key randomisation hypothesis. Using the conditions for s 0 and s 1 in (39) and (40) provides the following expressions for the success probabilities in the two cases of sampling with and without replacement.
Expressions for the success probability with the adjusted wrong key randomisation hypothesis and the standard right key randomisation hypothesis were obtained in [8] and [1] . Both the works followed the order statistics approach as used by Selçuk. The work [8] considered the setting of uniform random choice of P 1 , . . . , P N with replacement whereas [1] considered the setting of uniform random choice of P 1 , . . . , P N without replacement. Under the approximation 2 m ≈ 2 m − 1, the expressions obtained in [8] and [1] are equal to the first terms of (44) and (45) respectively. The reason why the complete expressions were not obtained in [8, 1] is similar to the reason why Selçuk was not able to obtain the complete expression for P (wr,std) S . The expressions for both P (wr,adj) S and P (wor,adj) S can be seen to be functions of | |, N and γ. Since γ itself is a function of the advantage a and the size of the target sub-key m, it follows that both P (wr,adj) S and P (wor,adj) S are functions of | |, N , a and m. None of these quantities are random variables, so neither are P (wr,adj) S and P (wor,adj) S random variables. Consequently, it is not meaningful to talk about the average value of P S or about the probability that P S is monotonous as has been done in [1] .
Understanding Non-Monotonic Behaviour
As in Section 3, let W κ * ∼ N (µ 0 , σ 2 0 ) and W κ ∼ N (0, σ 2 1 ) for κ = κ * . Assume µ 0 > 0. From (17), we obtain the expression for α, the probability of Type-1 error, to be α = 1 − P S = Φ((t − µ 0 )/σ 0 ) + Φ((−t − µ 0 )/σ 0 ). The first term arises from the upper bound on W κ * given in (16), i.e.,
From (19), t = σ 1 γ, where γ is a constant. Let π = Pr[W κ * ≤ t] and then 1 − π is the corresponding contribution to P S . Note that π is the area under the curve of the density function of W κ * from −∞ to t. Consider the setting of general key randomisation hypothesis where P 1 , . . . , P N are chosen with replacement. From (30) and (31)
. Since s 0 and s 1 are constants, σ 0 and σ 1 are both inversely proportional to N . So, as N increases the normal curve for W κ * becomes more concentrated around the mean . This is shown in Figures 1, 2 and 3 . Also, since γ is a constant, t = σ 1 γ is also inversely proportional to N . So, π is a function of N . One may expect π to be a monotonic decreasing function of N (and 1 − π to be a monotonic increasing function of N ), but, this does not necessarily hold as we explain below. Let N 1 < N 2 . The corresponding density functions for W κ * are f(x; , s 2 0 + 1/(4N 1 )) and f(x; , s 2 0 + 1/(4N 2 )). So, there is an x 0 such that the following hold: Figures 1, 2 and 3 .
Let t 1 = (s 2 1 + 1/(4N 1 ))γ and t 2 = (s 2 1 + 1/(4N 2 ))γ and so t 2 < t 1 . Let π 1 and π 2 be the values of π corresponding to N 1 and N 2 . There are two possibilities.
In this case, we have either t 2 < t 1 ≤ x 0 or t 2 ≤ x 0 < t 1 . From Figures 1 and 2 , in both cases, it can be noted that the area under the curve corresponding to N 1 is more than the area under the curve corresponding to N 2 . So, π 1 > π 2 . In other words, increasing N leads to π going down and correspondingly 1−π going up. As a result, in this case, the first term in the expression for success probability given by (17) increases with N .
In this case, we have x 0 < t 2 < t 1 . From Figure 3 , it is no longer clear that the area under the curve corresponding to N 1 is more than the area under the curve corresponding to N 2 . So, it cannot be definitely said that π 1 is more than π 2 and so the 1 − π does not necessarily go up. As a result, it can no longer be said that the first term in the expression for success probability given by (17) increases with N .
Note that the above explanation is purely statistical in nature. It is entirely based upon the expressions for the variances of the two normal distributions.
In the above discussion, we have tried to explain the possible non-monotonic behaviour of the probability of the event Pr[W κ * ≤ t] for the case of sampling with replacement. Considering this specific case makes it easy to see the dependence of the variances on N in determining possible non-monotonicity. The explanation extends to the complete expression for the success probability as well as to the case of sampling without replacement.
Explanations for non-monotonic behaviour have been provided in [8, 1] . In [8] , non-monotonicity has essentially been attributed to the strategy of sampling with replacement leading to duplicates. The later work [1] , observed non-monotonicity even for the strategy of sampling without replacement and so the explanation based on the occurrence of duplicates could not be applied. Instead, [1] provides an explanation for non-monotonicity for both sampling with and without replacement based on the ranking strategy used in the order statistics based approach. As we have seen, expressions for success probability can be obtained without using the order statistics based approach. So, an explanation of non-monotonicity based on order statistics based approach is not adequate. Instead, as we have tried to explain above, the phenomenon is better understood by considering that the variances of the two normal distributions in question are monotone decreasing with N . 
Dependence of P S on N
Consider the general expression for the success probability P S as given by (38). The subsequent expressions for success probability with/without replacement and under standard/adjusted key randomisation hypotheses are all obtained as special cases of (38). In (38), the quantities s 0 , s 1 and γ are constants which are independent of N and only σ depends on N as shown in (37). Further, from (37), it is clear that σ is a decreasing function of N for both the cases of with and without replacements.
We analyse the behaviour of P S as a function of N and identify the situations where P S is a monotonic increasing function of N . is such that δ 3 and higher powers of δ can be ignored. Then P S is an increasing function of N if and only if
We proceed by taking derivatives with respect to N . Since σ is a decreasing function of N ,
, where
Using the definition of the standard normal density function, we have
where 
, then f 2 (σ) < 0 and so dP S /dN < 0 which implies that P S is a decreasing function of N . This proves the second point.
So, suppose that s 0 < s 1 and s 2 1 − s 2 0 γ < | | σ 2 + s 2 1 both hold. By the condition of this case, we have 0 < δ < 1. Also, we have the assumption that δ is small enough such that δ 3 and higher powers of δ can be ignored. Then f 2 (σ) > 0 if and only if
Cancelling 2γ on both sides and rearranging the terms shows the third point.
Fisher information: Suppose a random variable Y follows a distribution whose density is given by a function g(y; θ 1 , θ 2 , . . .), where θ 1 , θ 2 , . . . are the finitely many parameters specifying the density function. A relevant question is how much information does the random variable Y carry about one particular parameter θ i . Fisher information is a well known measure in statistics for quantifying this information. The Fisher information about a parameter θ ∈ {θ 1 , θ 2 , . . .} carried in the random variable Y is defined to be
If Y ∼ N (µ, σ 2 ), then I Y (µ) = σ −2 . In other words, the information contained in the random variable Y is inversely proportional to σ 2 . So, as the variance increases, the information about the mean contained in the random variable Y decreases. We view the first point of Theorem 3 in the context of Fisher information. Recall that p κ * is a random variable following N (p, s 2 0 ) and p κ,κ * is a random variable following N (1/2, s 2 1 ). So, I p κ * (p) = s −2 0 and I p κ,κ * (1/2) = s −2
1 . From the first point of Theorem 3 we have that if s 0 > s 1 , then P S is an increasing function of N for all N > 0. Put in terms of Fisher information, this is equivalent to saying that if I p κ,κ * (1/2) ≥ I p κ * (p), then P S is an increasing function of N . More explicitly, if the information about the mean contained in p κ * is not more than the information about the mean contained in p κ,κ * , then increasing N increases the success probability. Viewed differently, if the variability of p κ * is at least as much as the variability of p κ,κ * , then the chances of the attack being successful increases as the number of observations increases.
Applying Theorem 3 to the case of standard key randomisation hypothesis, we have s 0 ↓ 0 and s 1 ↓ 0. So, by the first point of Theorem 3, it follows that both P (wr,std) S and P (wor,std) S are increasing functions of N for all N > 0.
Adjusted Wrong Key Randomisation Hypothesis
In this case s 2 1 = 2 −n−2 . Also, assuming the standard right key randomisation hypothesis (as in [8, 1] ), s 0 ↓ 0. So, Points 2 and 3 of Theorem 3 apply. This case is divided into two subcases. 
For sampling with replacement, it is more meaningful to consider 2 n/2 to be the upper bound for N , since beyond a sample size of 2 n/2 there will be too many repetitions in the sample. We have N is an increasing function of N and for
is a decreasing function of N .
We have the following.
The above is summarised as follows:
is a decreasing function of N in the range 0 < N < N is an increasing function of N for 0 < N ≤ 2 n .
We have s 1 = 2 −1−n/2 and γ = Φ −1 1 − 2 m−a−1 /(2 m − 1) , where 2 m /(2 m − 1) < a ≤ m. The maximum value of γ is achieved for a = m and this value is Φ −1 (2 m+1 − 3)/(2 m+1 − 2) which is around 8.21 for m ≤ 64. So, s 1 γ is not much greater than s 1 . It seems reasonable to assume that in practice the value of will turn out to be such that max(s 1 , s 1 γ) < | |. Under this condition, both P (wr,adj) S and P (wor,adj) S are increasing functions of N for 0 < N ≤ 2 n . In other words, the anomalous non-monotonic behaviour will mostly not occur in practice. The non-monotonic behaviour is observed only when the value of | | is small enough to be less than either s 1 or s 1 γ.
We further note the following point. The distribution of W κ for κ = κ * is approximated as N (0, 2 −n−2 + 1/(4N )) for sampling with replacement and is approximated as N (0, 1/(4N )) for sampling without replacement. As explained in Sections 5.1 and 5.2, both of these approximations require making the assumption that (p − 1/2) 2 is negligible for p ∈ [1/2 − ϑ 1 , 1/2 + ϑ 1 ]. From (23), the assumption is meaningful only if we consider s 2 1 2 −n/2 = 2 −2−n/2 to be negligible. So, the derivation of the distribution of W κ for κ = κ * is meaningful only if 2 −2−n/2 is considered to be negligible. Consequently, it is perhaps not meaningful to apply the analysis for values of | | lower than 2 −2−n/2 . This is a further argument that the analysis actually shows P S is a monotonic increasing function of N in the range where the analysis is actually meaningful.
Remarks:
The following comments are based on the assumption that γ ≈ Φ −1 (1 − 2 −a−1 ), i.e., 2 m ≈ 2 m − 1.
1. In [8] it was stated without proof that the first term of P We note that the complete picture of the dependence of the success probability on N was not provided in either [8] or [1] .
Conclusion
In this paper, we have carried out a detailed and complete analysis of success probability of linear cryptanalysis. This has been done under a single unifying framework which provides a deeper insight and a better understanding of how the success probability behaves with respect to the data complexity. .
The last equality follows from Proposition 1. So, X ∼ N (aµ, σ 2 1 + a 2 σ 2 2 ).
A.3 Hypergeometric Distribution
Suppose an urn contains N distinguishable balls out of which R are red and the rest are white. A sample of size n is chosen from the urn without replacement. For k ∈ {0, . . . , n}, the probability that there are exactly k red balls in the sample is p(k; n, N, R) =
Here p(k; n, N, R) is the probability mass function of the hypergeometric distribution H(k; n, N, R). Let p = R/N and q = 1 − p. According to Problem 2 in Section 11 of Chapter II of Feller [10] ,
Consequently, if N n, then p(k; n, N, R) ≈ n k p k q n−k . In other words, if N n, then the hypergeometric distribution is well approximated by the binomial distribution.
Another approximation of the hypergeometric distribution by the normal distribution appears in Problem 10 in Section 7 of Chapter VII of Feller [10] . Suppose t ∈ (0, 1) and p are such that n N → t, R N → p as n, N, R → ∞. Let h = 1/ Np(1 − p)t(1 − t) be such that h(k − np) → x. Then p(k; n, N, R) ∼ hΦ(x). Consequently, if Y is a random variable following the hypergeometric distribution H(k; n, N, R) then Y approximately follows N (pn, Np(1 − p)t(1 − t)). Conditions for the normal approximation to be meaningful and bounds on the error in the approximation have been provided in [19] . Using n = Nt, the random variable Y approximately follows N (pn, np(1 − p) (1 − t) ).
